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47 
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 
Aaron J. Campbell * 
INTRODUCTION 
This article surveys recent decisions of Virginia appellate 
courts in the field of criminal law and procedure. The article also 
outlines some of the most significant changes to criminal law and 
procedure enacted by the 2016 Virginia General Assembly. 
I.  CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
A.  Indictments 
In Herrington v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virgin-
ia considered whether the Commonwealth had the authority to 
obtain an indictment on a different charge than the one certified 
to the grand jury.
1
 The defendant was initially arrested and 
charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
sell or distribute.
2
 At the preliminary hearing on the charge, the 
district court found ―no probable cause to support the element of 
intent to sell or distribute.‖
3
 The district court therefore reduced 
the charge to simple possession of a controlled substance and cer-
tified that charge to the grand jury.
4
 The grand jury, nonetheless, 
indicted the defendant with the original distribution charge.
5
 The 
defendant unsuccessfully attempted to quash the indictment in 
circuit court.
6
 
 
 *  Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Section, Office of the Attorney Gen-
eral, Commonwealth of Virginia. J.D., 2009, University of Richmond School of Law; B.A., 
2002, Concord University. 
 1. 291 Va. 181, 183–84, 781 S.E.2d 561, 562–63 (2016).  
 2. Id. at 183, 781 S.E.2d at 562. 
 3. Id. at 184, 781 S.E.2d at 562. 
 4. Id. at 184, 781 S.E.2d at 562–63. 
 5. Id. at 184, 781 S.E.2d at 563. 
 6. Id.  
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The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the circuit court did 
not err in denying the defendant‘s motion to quash.
7
 In doing so, 
the supreme court rejected the defendant‘s contention that, by ob-
taining an indictment on a charge different than the certified 
charge, the Commonwealth ―amended‖ the indictment.
8
 The su-
preme court further rejected the defendant‘s argument that the 
indictment was improper or obtained by unlawful means.
9
 As a 
matter of settled law, the Commonwealth may obtain an indict-
ment from the grand jury for an offense ―for which the district 
court has previously found no probable cause.‖
10
 Likewise, a dis-
trict court‘s finding of probable cause for a charge does not bind 
the Commonwealth to that charge.
11
 Thus, ―[a]fter the district 
court certified the reduced charge of simple possession of a con-
trolled substance at the preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth 
was not required to obtain an indictment from the grand jury on 
that charge.‖
12
 
In Commonwealth v. Bass, a fatal variance existed between the 
indictments and the evidence presented at trial; however, the de-
fendant‘s attorney failed to make any objection to the variance.
13
 
The Supreme Court of Virginia described the variance as follows: 
[O]ne indictment alleged that Bass attempted to rob Videll Smith, 
and a second alleged that Bass robbed Irving Smith. However, the 
evidence proved only that Bass completed the robbery of Videll 
Smith, and the jury convicted Bass accordingly. Thus, a fatal vari-
ance existed between the indictments against Bass and the proof of-
fered by the Commonwealth at trial.
14
 
Since Bass‘ attorney failed to object to the variance, the su-
preme court considered whether the variance itself warranted  
applying the ends of justice exception to the contemporaneous ob-
jection rule.
15
 The Court of Appeals of Virginia had applied its 
ends of justice exception under Rule 5A:18 and reversed Bass‘ 
 
 7. Id. at 185, 781 S.E.2d at 564. 
 8. Id. at 184, 781 S.E.2d at 563. 
 9. Id. at 185, 781 S.E.2d at 563. 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. at 185, 781 S.E.2d at 564. 
 13. Commonwealth v. Bass, 292 Va. 19, 25, 786 S.E.2d 165, 168–69 (2016).  
 14. Id. at 28, 786 S.E.2d at 170.  
 15. Id. at 27, 786 S.E.2d at 169.   
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conviction.
16
 In finding that the court of appeals misapplied the 
exception, the supreme court held that there was no ―grave injus-
tice‖ that would entitle Bass to the ends of justice exception.
17
 
Under prior precedent, ―no grave injustice occurs merely because 
a variance exists between an indictment and the evidence offered 
at trial—even where the defendant is convicted of a greater crime 
than the one charged in the indictment.‖
18
 Because Bass failed to 
identify any reason for the application of the ends of justice ex-
ception beyond the variance, he waived his challenge to the suffi-
ciency of the evidence.
19
 
B.  Jail Attire in Jury Trials 
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that states 
―cannot, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, compel an 
accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable 
prison clothes.‖
20
 In Wilkins v. Commonwealth, the defendant 
claimed he had been tried in identifiable jail-issued clothing.
21
 
The only description in the record of the defendant‘s clothing 
came from his counsel: ―‗a green, sort of scrub outfit,‘ black 
sneakers, and ‗a visible bracelet on his left arm.‘‖
22
 In deciding 
whether this attire was ―readily identifiable‖ as jail-issued cloth-
ing, the Supreme Court of Virginia first asked which party has 
the burden of proof—the Commonwealth or the defendant?
23
 The 
supreme court held ―the defendant bears the burden of proving 
that the clothing he or she wore at trial was readily identifiable to 
the jury as jail attire.‖
24
 Clothing marked with indicia of incarcer-
ation weigh in favor of the defendant satisfying that burden.
25
 But 
in this case, the defendant failed to meet his burden of proving 
 
 16. Id. at 25, 786 S.E.2d at 169.   
 17. Id. at 28, 786 S.E.2d at 171–72.     
 18. Id. at 30, 786 S.E.2d at 171 (citing Henson v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 120, 121, 
128, 155 S.E.2d 346, 346, 351 (1967)).  
 19. Id. at 31–33, 786 S.E.2d at 172.  
 20. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976).  
 21. 292 Va. 2, 4, 786 S.E.2d 157, 157 (2016). 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. at 7, 786 S.E.2d at 159.   
 24. Id. at 7–8, 786 S.E.2d at 159.   
 25. Id. at 8, 786 S.E.2d at 160.   
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that the clothing described by his attorney at trial was readily 
identifiable as jail-issued clothing.
26
 
C.  Waiver of Right to Withdraw a Guilty Plea 
In Griffin v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia 
held, as a matter of first impression in Virginia, that a defendant 
can expressly waive the ability to withdraw a guilty plea through 
a plea agreement.
27
 The defendant signed a plea agreement with 
an express waiver of his right to withdraw his guilty plea.
28
 At the 
plea hearing, the circuit court reviewed the terms of the agree-
ment in detail with the defendant.
29
 During the plea colloquy, the 
defendant confirmed that he understood and agreed to the 
terms.
30
 But a few weeks later, the defendant requested to with-
draw his guilty plea.
31
 In finding no error in the circuit court‘s de-
nial of the request, the court of appeals explained that the ability 
to withdraw a guilty plea is conferred by statute and like other 
rights conferred by statute, can be waived.
32
 Because the defend-
ant expressly waived his ability to withdraw the plea, the court of 
appeals concluded that the circuit court did not err in holding the 
defendant to the terms of the agreement.
33
 
D. Sentencing Hearings 
In Grafmuller v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virgin-
ia reaffirmed the ―bright-line rule‖ established by Rawls v. Com-
monwealth that a defendant who has been sentenced in excess of 
the statutory maximum has the right to a new sentencing hear-
ing.
34
 The defendant had originally entered Alford pleas to his 
charges.
35
 The defendant later sought a new sentencing hearing 
 
 26. Id. at 9, 786 S.E.2d at 160.  
 27. 65 Va. App. 714, 720, 780 S.E.2d 909, 912 (2016).  
 28. Id. at 716, 780 S.E.2d at 910. 
 29. Id. at 717, 780 S.E.2d at 910–11. 
 30. Id. at 719, 780 S.E.2d at 911–12. 
 31. Id. at 717, 780 S.E.2d at 911. 
 32. Id. at 718, 780 S.E.2d at 911 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-296 (Repl. Vol. 2015 & 
Supp. 2016)). 
 33. Id. at 720, 780 S.E.2d at 912. 
 34. 290 Va. 525, 529, 778 S.E.2d 114, 116 (2015) (citing Rawls v. Commonwealth, 278 
Va. 213, 221, 683 S.E.2d 544, 549 (2009)). 
 35. Id. at 527, 778 S.E.2d at 114–15. 
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because his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum.
36
 Rather 
than grant the defendant a new sentencing hearing, the trial 
judge, who had imposed the original sentence, simply entered an 
amended sentencing order.
37
 
On appeal, the Commonwealth argued that Rawls should be 
limited to sentences that had been imposed by juries.
38
 The su-
preme court declined to create an exception to Rawls.
39
 The su-
preme court reasoned that an exception would ―re-introduce to 
this area of the law both a lack of uniformity and a need for spec-
ulation as to what the sentence would have been.‖
40
 For instance, 
the original sentencing judge may not always be available to re-
sentence the defendant.
41
 An exception would also run afoul of the 
defendant‘s constitutional and statutory right to be present dur-
ing the trial.
42
 Thus, the supreme court held that a defendant who 
has been sentenced in excess of the statutory maximum, regard-
less of whether the sentence was imposed by a judge or a jury, 
has a right to a new sentencing hearing.
43
 
In Nunez v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia 
found harmless error in the circuit court‘s decision to pronounce a 
sentence without the defendant present.
44
 At a hearing following 
the defendant‘s guilty plea and preparation of the pre-sentence 
report, the circuit court decided to make a deferred disposition.
45
 
Several months later, the defendant had voluntarily returned to 
Bolivia after the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency 
took custody of him.
46
 The defendant was therefore absent for his 
subsequent hearings on the deferred disposition.
47
 The circuit 
court eventually imposed a fine in the defendant‘s absence and 
suspended it in its entirety.
48
 
 
 36. Id. at 527–28, 778 S.E.2d at 115.  
 37. Id. at 528, 778 S.E.2d at 115. 
 38. Id. at 530, 778 S.E.2d at 116. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. at 531, 778 S.E.2d at 116. 
 41. Id. at 531, 778 S.E.2d at 116–17.  
 42. Id. at 531, 778 S.E.2d at 117 (citing U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; VA. CONST. art. 
I, §§ 8, 11; VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-259 (Repl. Vol. 2015 & Supp. 2016)).  
 43. Id. at 531,778 S.E.2d at 117. 
 44. 66 Va. App. 152, 155, 783 S.E.2d 62, 63–64 (2016).  
 45. Id. at 155, 783 S.E.2d at 64. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. at 156, 783 S.E.2d at 64. 
 48. Id.  
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Operating on the assumption that the circuit court erred in 
sentencing the defendant in his absence, the court of appeals held 
that the error was subject to harmless error analysis.
49
 Specifical-
ly, the court of appeals applied the ―harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt‖ standard of review for constitutional error.
50
 In conducting 
this analysis, the court of appeals found three relevant circum-
stances: (1) the defendant‘s presence during the guilt phase and 
circuit court‘s review of the presentence report; (2) his undisputed 
failure to comply with the terms of his deferred disposition; and 
(3) the lenient sentence of a suspended fine.
51
 Under these unique 
circumstances, the court of appeals concluded that the circuit 
court‘s decision to pronounce a sentence without the defendant‘s 
presence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
52
 
In Harvey v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia 
decided whether a victim of a crime may testify about the details 
of those crimes at the sentencing hearing.
53
 The defendant argued 
that a victim may not testify to the facts of the crime itself be-
cause Virginia Code sections 19.2-295.3 and 19.2-299.1 limit the 
scope of a victim‘s testimony at a sentencing hearing to ―victim 
impact evidence.‖
54
 The court of appeals examined the plain lan-
guage of those statutes, as well as language from the Virginia 
Constitution that crime victims have a ―meaningful role in the 
criminal justice process,‖ and concluded that a victim may testify 
as to the underlying facts of the crime at the sentencing hearing.
55
 
The court of appeals stressed that the circuit court has discretion 
to exclude testimony about the crime.
56
 But when that testimony 
would assist the circuit court as it considers what sentence to im-
pose, Virginia Code sections 19.2-295.3 and 19.2-299.1 do not 
compel courts to exclude the testimony.
57
 
 
 49. Id. at 158, 783 S.E.2d at 65. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at 159, 783 S.E.2d at 66. 
 52. Id.  
 53. 65 Va. App. 280, 281, 777 S.E.2d 231, 232 (2015).  
 54. Id. at 285, 777 S.E.2d at 234. 
 55. Id. at 285–86, 777 S.E.2d at 234 (quoting VA. CONST. art. I, § 8A).  
 56. Id. at 286–87, 777 S.E.2d at 235. 
 57. Id. at 287, 777 S.E.2d at 235. 
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E. Collateral Estoppel and Double Jeopardy 
In Commonwealth v. Davis, the Supreme Court of Virginia con-
sidered whether collateral estoppel barred the defendant‘s felony 
convictions after he had been acquitted of a misdemeanor arising 
from same course of conduct.
58
 Davis was arrested following a fa-
tal shooting outside a restaurant in which the shooter fired sev-
eral gunshots into an occupied parked car.
59
 Davis was charged 
with felonies related to the shooting and a misdemeanor offense 
of reckless handling of a firearm.
60
 He first appeared in general 
district court for a trial on the misdemeanor and a preliminary 
hearing on the felonies.
61
 At the conclusion of the hearing, the dis-
trict court dismissed the misdemeanor charge and refused to cer-
tify the felony charges to the circuit court.
62
 The district court spe-
cifically found that the Commonwealth failed to prove Davis had 
fired the weapon.
63
 Thereafter, the Commonwealth obtained di-
rect indictments against Davis for ―first-degree murder and at-
tempted first-degree murder.‖
64
 Davis moved to dismiss the in-
dictments, arguing that his acquittal on the misdemeanor firearm 
charge collaterally estopped the Commonwealth from trying him 
on the murder charges.
65
 After the motion failed, Davis was tried 
and convicted of the murder charges.
66
 
The supreme court agreed with a majority of the Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia that collateral estoppel barred Davis‘ murder 
prosecution.
67
 The supreme court observed that the felony murder 
charges and misdemeanor firearm charge stemmed from the 
same alleged course of conduct and required proof of the same is-
sue of ―ultimate fact‖—that Davis committed the shooting.
68
 Ac-
cordingly, the district court‘s finding that the Commonwealth 
 
 58. 290 Va. 362, 365, 777 S.E.2d 555, 556 (2015).  
 59. Id.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. at 366, 777 S.E.2d at 557. 
 63. Id. at 367, 777 S.E.2d at 557. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id.  
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. at 367–68, 777 S.E.2d at 557 (discussing Davis v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. App. 
45, 754 S.E.2d 533 (2014) and Davis v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 70, 764 S.E.2d 724 
(2014)).  
 68. Id. at 371, 777 S.E.2d at 559. 
CAMPBELL 511.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2016  9:47 AM 
54 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:47 
 
failed to prove Davis as the shooter was a ―determination of that 
fact,‖ which applied to all three charges.
69
 And ―[w]hen the Com-
monwealth obtained felony convictions that relied upon that spe-
cific fact, it put Davis twice in jeopardy for the same offense and 
violated his rights under the Fifth Amendment.‖
70
 
In Currier v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia 
addressed a collateral estoppel challenge to a charge that had 
been severed with the defendant‘s consent.
71
 The grand jury in-
dicted the defendant on charges of ―burglary, grand larceny, and 
possession of a firearm as a convicted felon.‖
72
 Prior to trial, the 
parties agreed to sever the firearm charge from the other two 
charges.
73
 The first jury acquitted the defendant of the burglary 
and larceny,
74
 but a second jury convicted him of the firearm 
charge.
75
 
The defendant argued that his acquittal in the prior trial 
meant that his conviction was barred by collateral estoppel pro-
tections under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
76
 The court of ap-
peals, however, agreed with the Commonwealth that the sever-
ance of the firearm charge did not ―bring into play the concern 
that lies at the core of the Double Jeopardy Clause: the avoidance 
of prosecutorial oppression and overreaching through successive 
trials.‖
77
 As the court of appeals explained, ―[t]he point of separate 
trials here was to benefit the defendant by avoiding the undue 
prejudice that would occur upon mention of the defendant‘s felo-
nious past to a jury.‖
78
 Therefore, the court of appeals held that 
collateral estoppel did not foreclose a second trial when the 
charge had been ―severed with the defendant‘s consent and for his 
benefit.‖
79
 
 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. at 371–72, 777 S.E.2d at 559. Justice McClanahan dissented for the reasons 
stated by the dissenting opinion of the panel decision of the Court of Appeals. Id. at 373, 
777 S.E.2d at 560 (McClanahan, J., dissenting).  
 71. 65 Va. App. 605, 608–09, 779 S.E.2d 834, 835–36 (2015).  
 72. Id. at 608, 779 S.E.2d at 835. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 609, 779 S.E.2d at 835. 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. at 609, 779 S.E.2d at 836. 
 78. Id. at 613, 779 S.E.2d at 837. 
 79. Id.  
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In Green v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia 
held, for the first time in Virginia, that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause does not apply to probation revocation proceedings.
80
 
Green maintained that his probation violation was based on be-
havior he had already been punished for in a previous probation 
violation proceeding.
81
 Green asked the court of appeals to consid-
er whether the circuit court violated his constitutional right not 
to be placed in jeopardy for the same offense twice.
82
 In finding 
that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy was not 
applicable, the court of appeals relied upon the Supreme Court of 
the United States precedent that ―[t]here is no double jeopardy 
protection against revocation of a probation and the imposition of 
imprisonment.‖
83
 The court of appeals noted, however, that 
―[w]hile double jeopardy does not apply in the probation setting, 
certain due process rights do attach.‖
84
 Green, however, did not 
provide an adequate record to enable the court of appeals to de-
termine if any due process violations occurred.
85
 
F. Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
In the combined cases of Vasquez v. Commonwealth and Valen-
tin v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia determined 
whether the defendants‘ term-of-years sentences violated the 
Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ment.
86
 When Vasquez and Valentin were sixteen-years-old, they 
broke into a college student‘s townhouse, raped her at knifepoint, 
and threatened to kill her if she resisted.
87
 Consequently, Vasquez 
and Valentin were convicted of multiple felonies.
88
 The circuit 
court sentenced Vasquez to a total sentence of 283 years in pris-
 
 80. 65 Va. App. 524, 533, 779 S.E.2d 207, 212 (2015).  
 81. Id. at 531, 779 S.E.2d at 211. 
 82. Id. at 532, 779 S.E.2d at 211. 
 83. Id. at 533, 779 S.E.2d at 212 (quoting United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 
137 (1980)). 
 84. Id. The court of appeals also noted that Virginia has codified the protection of 
double jeopardy for probation violation hearings in Virginia Code section 19.2-306. Id. at 
535 n.3, 779 S.E.2d at 213 n.3. Since that statute was not raised as an assignment of er-
ror, the court refused to address the merits of a statutory argument. Id.  
 85. Id. at 535, 779 S.E.2d at 213. 
 86. 291 Va. 232, 236, 781 S.E.2d 920, 922 (2016).  
 87. Id. at 235–36, 781 S.E.2d at 922. 
 88. Id. at 236, 781 S.E.2d at 922. 
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on, with 150 years suspended, while Valentin received 148 years 
in prison, with 80 years suspended.
89
 ―Between the two defend-
ants and their total of thirty convictions, each conviction received 
an average of 6.7 years of active incarceration.‖
90
 
Vasquez and Valentin argued that their multiple term-of-years 
sentences violated the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unu-
sual punishment.
91
 Specifically, they argued that Graham v. Flor-
ida’s
92
 prohibition of life-without-parole sentences should be ex-
panded to ―non-life sentences that, when aggregated, exceed the 
normal life spans of juvenile offenders.‖
93
 In declining to expand 
the holding in Graham, the supreme court clarified that Graham 
applied only to ―the imposition of a life without parole sentence on 
a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.‖
94
 Since neither 
Vasquez nor Valentin was convicted of a single crime resulting in 
a life-without-parole sentence, the supreme court concluded that 
their cases were unlike Graham.
95
 Ultimately, the supreme court 
agreed with two of the three United States Courts of Appeal that 
have addressed the issue: ―Graham does not apply to aggregate 
term-of-years sentences involving multiple crimes.‖
96
 Therefore, 
the court rejected the argument that Vasquez and Valentin‘s sen-
tences violated the Eight Amendment ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment.
97
 
 
 89. Id. at 239, 781 S.E.2d at 924. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. at 240, 781 S.E.2d at 924. 
 92. 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (holding that the Constitution prohibits life without parole 
sentences for nonhomicidal juvenile offenders). 
 93. Vasquez, 291 Va. at 241, 781 S.E.2d at 925. 
 94. Id. (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 82) (emphasis added).  
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. at 246, 781 S.E.2d at 928. 
 97. Id. Justice Mims, joined by Justice Goodwyn, concurred with the majority‘s con-
clusion that Vasquez and Valentin‘s sentences did not violate the Eighth Amendment‘s 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 251, 781 S.E.2d at 931 (Mims, J., con-
curring). However, unlike the majority, Justice Mims believed Graham ―does apply to a 
term-of-years sentence that constitutes a de facto life sentence imposed in a single sen-
tencing event.‖ Id. at 252, 781 S.E.2d at 931. Justice Mims concluded, however, that prior 
precedent dictates that ―Virginia‘s geriatric release statute provides the requisite mean-
ingful opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation that 
Graham requires.‖ Id. (citing Angel v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 248, 274, 704 S.E.3d 386, 
401 (2011)). Yet, Justice Mims questioned ―whether the geriatric release statute as applied 
will continue to provide the ‗meaningful opportunity for release‘ required by Graham.‖ Id. 
at 258, 781 S.E.2d at 935 (emphasis added). 
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G.  Pardons 
In Blount v. Clarke the Supreme Court of Virginia interpreted 
the Governor‘s pardon power.
98
 When Blount was fifteen years 
old, he participated in an armed robbery.
99
 Blount was convicted 
of forty-nine counts related to the robbery and sentenced to six 
life sentences, as well as 118 mandatory years in prison.
100
 After 
exhausting his post-conviction remedies in state court, Blount 
filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, contend-
ing that his life sentences were unconstitutional under Graham.
101
 
As that case was ongoing, Blount filed a request for a conditional 
pardon with the Governor‘s office, asking then-Governor McDon-
nell to modify his sentence ―to a more appropriate amount of time 
for the crimes he committed, which many believe might be some-
where between ten and twenty years‘ incarceration.‖
102
 In 2014, 
Governor McDonnell issued an executive order, which reduced 
Blount‘s incarceration to forty years.
103
 This action left the federal 
habeas corpus case in doubt.
104
 
The federal court sent certified questions to the Supreme Court 
of Virginia asking, whether the Governor of Virginia had issued a 
pardon or a commutation, and whether the actions by the Gover-
nor were valid under the Virginia Constitution.
105
 In answering 
the questions, the supreme court interpreted the Governor‘s par-
don power under Article V, section 12 of the Constitution of Vir-
ginia as threefold.
106
 The  Governor  has  the  power  to: ―(1) grant 
reprieves; (2) grant pardons; and (3) commute capital punish-
ment.‖
107
 Upon examining the history of executive clemency in 
Virginia, the supreme court determined that, while the Governor 
lacks the power to commute non-capital sentences, the Governor 
 
 98. 291 Va. 198, 201, 782 S.E.2d 152, 153 (2016).  
 99. Id. at 202, 782 S.E.2d at 154. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 203, 782 S.E.2d at 153. 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id.  
 104. See id. at 204, 782 S.E.2d at 154. 
 105. Id. at 201–02, 782 S.E.2d at 153. 
 106. Id. at 205, 782 S.E.2d at 155.  
 107. Id.  
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is vested with the power to issue a ―partial pardon.‖
108
 The su-
preme court explained that the difference between a partial par-
don and a commutation is that a partial pardon ―lessens the pun-
ishment by degrees,‖ while a commutation ―changes the kind of 
punishment from death to life imprisonment.‖
109
 The supreme 
court concluded that the executive order from Governor McDon-
nell constituted a partial pardon because it contained no condi-
tions and exonerated Blount from some, but not all, punishment 
for his crimes.
110
 
II.  CRIMINAL LAW 
A.  Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure 
1.  Exigent Circumstances 
In Evans v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia 
held that exigent circumstances justified the police entering the 
defendant‘s apartment without a warrant.
111
 Three police officers 
on bicycle patrol noticed an ―extremely strong odor of marijuana 
coming from an apartment window,‖
112
 prompting them to knock 
―on the apartment door three times.‖
113
 ―Evans‘ mother answered 
each time.‖
114
 During the second encounter, she appeared to be 
―shaking‖ and ―nervous.‖
115
 ―She exclaimed, ‗[a]in‘t nobody smok-
ing weed in here,‘ and then ‗slammed‘ the door‖ in an officer‘s 
face.
116
 The officers could smell ―the odor of marijuana ‗like a gust 
of wind‘ coming from inside the apartment,‖ so they knocked a 
third time.
117
 There was no answer for approximately five 
minutes, but the officers could hear ―unspecified movement inside 
 
 108. See id. at 205–06, 782 S.E.2d at 155–56. 
 109. Id. at 208, 782 S.E.2d at 157. 
 110. Id. at 211, 782 S.E.2d at 158. The three-justice dissent would have applied Lee v. 
Murphy, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 789 (1872) and held that Governor McDonnell issued a commu-
tation, or at the least a conditional pardon, of the sentences. See id. at 212, 782 S.E.2d at 
158–59 (Kelsey, J., dissenting).  
 111. 290 Va. 277, 283, 776 S.E.2d 760, 762 (2015).  
 112. Id. at 280, 776 S.E.2d at 761. 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. at 281, 776 S.E.2d at 761.  
 116. Id.  
 117. Id.  
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the apartment.‖
118
 When ―Evans‘ mother finally opened the door, 
she quickly tried to close it again.‖
119
 The officers entered the 
apartment and observed marijuana in plain view.
120
 A subsequent 
search yielded other illegal drugs and firearms.
121
 
The supreme court held that two facts established exigent cir-
cumstances to the Fourth Amendment‘s warrant requirement 
prior to officers entering the apartment: (1) ―the cloud of heavy 
and extremely strong marijuana odors‖ and (2) ―the contempora-
neous knowledge of Evans‘ mother that the investigating officers 
at her doorway smelled the marijuana, which would naturally 
give her a potent incentive to destroy, discard, or hide the illegal 
drug (or ask others to do so) soon after she closed the door.‖
122
 
While these facts, by themselves, established exigent circum-
stances, the behavior and statements from Evans‘ mother provid-
ed additional justification for the officers to enter the apart-
ment.
123
 For example, Evans‘ mother‘s remark, ―[a]in‘t nobody 
smoking weed in here,‖ followed by the slamming of the door, 
―implied that [she] knew the police officers were aware that mari-
juana was present in the apartment, and she needed a little time 
and privacy to something about the problem.‖
124
 The supreme 
court concluded that the officers were justified in entering the 
apartment without a warrant ―to thwart the objectively reasona-
ble possibility that evidence would be destroyed, discarded, or 
hidden if they did not take immediate action.‖
125
 
2.  Reasonable Suspicion 
In Mason v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia re-
solved whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a 
 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id.  
 120. Id.  
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. at 285, 776 S.E.2d at 764. 
 123. Id.  
 124. Id. at 281, 285–86, 776 S.E.2d at 761, 764.  
 125. Id. at 291, 776 S.E.2d at 767. The supreme court also rejected Evans‘ contention 
that the police, by announcing their presence and awareness of the marijuana, created the 
exigency. Id. at 288, 776 S.E.2d at 765–66. A three-justice dissent believed the majority 
had wrongly ―permit[ted] the government to dispense with the constitutional requirement 
to obtain a warrant before entering a private residence if law enforcement officers have 
probable cause to suspect criminal activity, make contact with an occupant, and announce 
their suspicions before entering.‖ Id. at 291–92, 776 S.E.2d at 767 (Mims, J., dissenting).  
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Terry stop of an automobile based on observing a ―dangling ob-
ject‖ from the vehicle‘s rearview mirror.
126
 The dangling object in 
question was an opaque plastic parking pass approximately three 
inches by five inches in size.
127
 The officer believed the dangling 
object might be in violation of Virginia Code section 46.2-2-1054, 
prohibiting any object from being ―suspended from any part of the 
motor vehicle in such a manner as to obstruct the driver‘s clear 
view of the highway through the windshield, the front side win-
dows, or the rear window.‖
128
 The defendant, a passenger in the 
vehicle, sought to suppress the illegal contraband recovered from 
the traffic stop.
129
 The trial court denied his motion to suppress.
130
 
The supreme court agreed to hear the case after a closely divided 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, sitting en banc, affirmed the judg-
ment of the trial court.
131
 
The supreme court framed the issue as ―whether the facts and 
circumstances apparent to the officer at the time he decided to 
make the stop were such as to create in the mind of a reasonable 
officer in the same position a suspicion that a violation of the law 
was occurring.‖
132
 In considering this issue, the supreme court ex-
plained that the legislative purpose of Virginia Code section 46.2-
1054 is ―far from trivial.‖
133
 Given the configurations of modern 
vehicles, the statute‘s prohibition on dangling objects is meant to 
prevent a driver‘s view from being obstructed from dangers such 
as when ―another vehicle backs out of a shrubbery-screened 
driveway ahead or a child darts out from between parked cars in-
to a residential street in pursuit of a ball or a runaway pet.‖
134
 The 
supreme court recognized that officers charged with enforcing the 
statute are confronted with a ―demanding task‖ and with a ―vir-
tual impossibility‖ of determining whether a dangling object ob-
structs the driver while the car is in motion.
135
 The supreme court 
concluded that ―[a] reasonable person could readily conclude from 
 
 126. 291 Va. 362, 371–72, 786 S.E.2d 148, 150 (2016).   
 127. Id. at 366, 786 S.E.2d at 150. 
 128. Id. at 365, 786 S.E.2d at 150.  
 129. Id. at 366, 786 S.E.2d at 150. 
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. at 366, 786 S.E.2d at 150–51.  
 132. Id. at 368, 786 S.E.2d at 151.  
 133. Id. at 370, 786 S.E.2d at 153.  
 134. Id. at 371, 786 S.E.2d at 153.  
 135. Id. at 371, 786 S.E.2d at 154. 
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the fact that the tag was sufficiently prominent to attract the of-
ficer‘s attention during the brief moments that it passed through 
his field of view that it might have violated the statute.‖
136
 
3.  Consensual Searches 
In Hawkins v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia 
decided whether a defendant‘s nonverbal actions constituted con-
sent for police to search his person.
137
 A group of officers encoun-
tered Hawkins and another man on the street.
138
 Upon seeing a 
bulge under Hawkins‘s shirt Officer Mazzio asked ―Hawkins if he 
had ‗a big cell phone on [his] belt, and then asked him if he ‗could 
do him a favor‘ by raising his ‗shirt up a little bit so [Mazzio 
could] see how it sits.‘‖
139
 In response, ―Hawkins extended his 
arms completely out to his sides and raised them about halfway 
up to his shoulders with his palms facing the officers.‖
140
 ―[A]n of-
ficer lifted the tail of Hawkins‘s shirt and revealed the handle of a 
handgun tucked into his waistband.‖
141
 ―Hawkins was arrested for 
possessing a firearm as a convicted felon.‖
142
 After his arrest, 
Hawkins told an officer that he did not initially warn the officers 
of the gun so as not to startle them, but he eventually ―came 
around and showed the officers that he . . . was indeed wearing a 
firearm.‖
143
 
In denying Hawkins‘s attempt to suppress the firearm, the tri-
al court determined that Hawkins had consented to the lifting of 
his shirt.
144
 The court of appeals agreed that ―Hawkins‘s non-
verbal response to Mazzio‘s requests invited the officers to lift his 
shirt.‖
145
 Comparing him to a suspect who places his or her hands 
on a wall when an officer requests to perform a search, the court 
of appeals concluded that Hawkins assumed a well-known ―frisk 
 
 136. Id.   
 137. 65 Va. App. 101, 103, 774 S.E.2d 492, 493 (2015).  
 138. Id. at 104, 774 S.E.2d at 494.  
 139. Id. at 105, 774 S.E.2d at 494. 
 140. Id.  
 141. Id.  
 142. Id.  
 143. Id.   
 144. Id.  
 145. Id. at 108–09, 774 S.E.2d at 496. 
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stance‖ that implied his consented to the search.
146
 The court of 
appeals additionally determined that Hawkins‘s statements to 
the police afterwards implied that he made a conscious decision to 
show police the firearm.
147
 The court of appeals thus upheld the 
trial court‘s determination that the search was consensual.
148
 
In McLaughlin v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia addressed whether a probation officer had the authority to 
enter the defendant‘s house or bedroom and, thus, was not in a 
lawful position to see a handgun in plain view.
149
 McLaughlin‘s 
supervised probation contained a provision allowing probation of-
ficers to visit his home.
150
 The probation officer had information 
that McLaughlin was living with his sister in a trailer in Virginia 
Beach.
151
 When the probation officer arrived at that residence, an 
adult female answered the door.
152
 The woman, who was enter-
taining guests at the time, appeared to be living at the resi-
dence.
153
 The woman allowed the probation officer both into the 
house and into McLaughlin‘s bedroom.
154
 Upon opening the bed-
room door, the probation officer saw McLaughlin asleep in a bed, 
with a handgun in plain view.
155
 
In considering whether the handgun should have been sup-
pressed, the court of appeals recognized that a ―home visit‖ from a 
probation officer does not operate as a full Fourth Amendment 
waiver.
156
 That court of appeals, however, held that a reasonable 
officer in the probation officer‘s position would have thought that 
the woman who let the officer into the residence had the apparent 
authority to do so.
157
 Likewise, the woman had a sufficient rela-
tionship to the premises to justify a reasonable person in the pro-
 
 146. Id. at 109, 774 S.E.2d at 496.  
 147. Id.  
 148. Id. at 109–10, 774 S.E.2d at 496. Concurring in the judgment, Judge Petty found 
it unnecessary to decide whether Hawkins consented to the search because, in his view, 
the officers were justified in lifting the shirt based on their reasonable suspicion that 
Hawkins might be armed. Id. at 110, 774 S.E.2d at 496–97 (Petty, J., concurring).  
 149. 65 Va. App. 427, 430, 778 S.E.2d 529, 530–31 (2015).  
 150. Id. at 430, 778 S.E.2d at 531.  
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. at 432, 778 S.E.2d at 531. 
 153. Id.  
 154. Id.  
 155. Id. at 432, 778 S.E.2d at 532. 
 156. Id. at 435, 778 S.E.2d at 533. 
 157. Id. at 435–36, 778 S.E.2d at 533.  
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bation officer‘s position to conclude that the woman had the au-
thority to take the officer into McLaughin‘s bedroom.
158
 ―[B]ecause 
a person with apparent authority admitted the probation officer 
into the house and the bedroom, the probation officer was lawful-
ly in a position to‖ view the gun in plain view.
159
 
4.  Drug Dog Sniffs 
In Sanders v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia 
took up whether drug dog sniffs outside the door of the defend-
ant‘s two motel room doors were searches under the Fourth 
Amendment.
160
 The court of appeals rejected the defendant‘s ar-
gument that he was entitled to the same protections on the ex-
ternal walkway, adjacent to the door of each motel room, as 
someone would have on the front porch of their home.
161
 The court 
of appeals concluded that, based upon a number of factors, the 
walkways did not qualify as curtilage to the defendant‘s home.
162
 
The court of appeals further concluded that, considering the total-
ity of the circumstances, the defendant ―had no objectively rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the external motel walkways.‖
163
 
For instance, the defendant ―had a possessory interest in the two 
rooms themselves, but as to the walkways, his interest, like that 
of the other motel guests, was one of common, not exclusive, use 
and access.‖
164
 Thus, the court held that ―the dog sniffs conducted 
on the common external walkways outside the [defendant‘s] motel 
room doors were not searches under the Fourth Amendment.‖
165
 
5.  GPS Tracking Devices 
In Turner v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia 
considered whether the use of a Global Positioning System 
(―GPS‖) tracking device on the defendant‘s vehicle violated the 
 
 158. Id. at 437, 778 S.E.2d at 534.  
 159. Id. at 438, 778 S.E.2d at 534. 
 160. 64 Va. App. 734, 739, 772 S.E.2d 15, 17 (2015).  
 161. Id. at 747, 772 S.E.2d at 21 (interpreting Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 
(2013)).  
 162. Id. at 749, 772 S.E.2d at 22 (applying United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 
(1987)). 
 163. Id. at 753, 772 S.E.2d at 24. 
 164. Id.  
 165. Id. at 756, 772 S.E.2d at 25. 
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Fourth Amendment.
166
 Based upon information that Turner was 
involved in cocaine trafficking, the police obtained a search war-
rant permitting the placement of a GPS tracking device on 
Turner‘s vehicle.
167
 The warrant allowed the tracking device to be 
used for a period of thirty days.
168
 Shortly after it had been at-
tached, however, police learned that Turner intended to take the 
vehicle to a garage for repairs.
169
 A detective therefore removed 
the tracking device to avoid its detection.
170
 A few days later, the 
detective reinstalled the tracking device on Turner‘s vehicle.
171
 
Relying upon United States v. Jones,
172
 Turner contended that 
the reattachment of the GPS device constituted a new search and 
thus required a second warrant under the Fourth Amendment.
173
 
The court of appeals concluded, however, that Jones actually rein-
forced the ―principle that a search or seizure pursuant to a 
properly obtained and issued warrant is valid so long as the 
search or seizure is within the scope of the warrant.‖
174
 The court 
of appeals noted that both the removal and subsequent reattach-
ment of the device occurred within the original thirty-day period 
authorized by the warrant.
175
 The court of appeals therefore held 
―that the removal and reattachment of the GPS tracking device 
was a single, continuing search that was authorized by the war-
rant‖ and, thus, valid under the Fourth Amendment.
176
 
B.  Specific Crimes 
1.  Child Pornography 
In two opinions, the Court of Appeals of Virginia considered the 
evidence required to support a conviction for possession of child 
pornography in violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-460(A). In 
 
 166. 65 Va. App. 312, 318, 777 S.E.2d 569, 572 (2015). 
 167. Id.  
 168. Id.  
 169. Id. at 318–19, 777 S.E.2d at 572.  
 170. Id. at 319, 777 S.E.2d at 572. 
 171. Id. at 319, 777 S.E.2d at 573. 
 172. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 173. Turner, 65 Va. App. at 321, 777 S.E.2d at 573–74. 
 174. Id. at 321–22, 777 S.E.2d at 574. 
 175. See id. at 322–23, 777 S.E.2d at 574. 
 176. Id. at 323, 777 S.E.2d at 574–75. 
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Terlecki v. Commonwealth, the defendant‘s former-girlfriend tes-
tified at trial that she saw images of child pornography in the re-
cycle bin of the defendant‘s laptop.
177
 Although none of the images 
were admitted into evidence, the ex-girlfriend described the por-
nographic nature of the images and identified the subjects of the 
photographs as minors.
178
 On redirect, she ―testified that the im-
ages did not ‗appear to be computer generated in any way‘ and 
‗appeared to be real people.‘‖
179
 
Relying heavily on the fact that the images were not admitted 
into evidence, the defendant argued that the evidence failed to 
exclude the possibility that the images were computer-generated, 
rather than actual people.
180
 The court of appeals held that, while 
the images were not admitted into evidence, the Commonwealth 
could still meet its burden of proof by other competent evidence.
181
 
In this case, the Commonwealth did so by presenting two pieces 
of evidence.
182
 First, the ex-girlfriend testified in detail that the 
pornographic images were of actual minors.
183
 Second, the defend-
ant admitted in a police interview to possessing pornography con-
taining ―small children from the ages of . . . eight to seventeen.‖
184
 
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Com-
monwealth, the court of appeals concluded the ―evidence was suf-
ficient for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the images 
depicted ‗identifiable minors‘ as their subject.‖
185
 
In Kobman v. Commonwealth, the location of the child pornog-
raphy on the computer was dispositive on whether the defendant 
possessed the images beyond a reasonable doubt.
186
 Nine of the 
images were in the defendant‘s desktop computer‘s recycle bin 
under the user account named ―Kobman.‖
187
 Forty-five images 
were in the defendant‘s desktop and laptop computers‘ ―unallo-
 
 177. 65 Va. App 13, 16, 772 S.E.2d 777, 779 (2015).  
 178. Id. at 16–17, 772 S.E.2d at 779.  
 179. Id. at 17, 772 S.E.2d at 779. 
 180. Id. at 19–20, 772 S.E.2d at 780–81. 
 181. Id. at 21, 772 S.E.2d at 781. 
 182. See id. at 22, 772 S.E.2d at 781. 
 183. Id.  
 184. Id. at 22, 772 S.E.2d at 782.  
 185. Id. at 23, 772 S.E.2d at 782.  
 186. 65 Va. App. 304, 306–08, 777 S.E.2d 565, 566–67 (2015).  
 187. Id. at 306, 777 S.E.2d at 566. 
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cated space.‖
188
 An investigator found these images using special 
forensic ―software designed to restore deleted and damaged data 
that is not otherwise accessible to the computer‘s user.‖
189
 
The court of appeals agreed with the Commonwealth‘s conces-
sion that the convictions based on the forty-five photographs 
found in the unallocated space should be reversed.
190
 There was 
no evidence that the defendant was ―aware of, or exercised domin-
ion and control over‖ those forty-five photographs.
191
 For instance, 
there was no evidence he had access to the software necessary to 
retrieve the deleted photographs.
192
 As for the remaining nine 
counts associated with the photographs found in the recycle bin, 
the court upheld those convictions.
193
 A number of circumstances 
supported the verdict, including the fact that the photographs 
were found in the recycle bin associated with the defendant‘s last 
name, and that he made incriminating remarks to the police as 
they executed the search warrant.
194
 
2.  Construction Fraud 
Bowman v. Commonwealth involved a conviction of construc-
tion fraud against a contractor who accepted a $2100 deposit from 
a homeowner to install a replacement liner in a swimming pool.
195
 
After the contractor failed to complete the job on time, the home-
owner called the police.
196
 The police advised him to send a ―certi-
fied letter‖ to the contractor.
197
 The homeowner did that, but the 
letter was returned unopened.
198
 That letter was entered into evi-
dence, but never opened at any point during or after the trial.
199
 
The owner sent a second letter to a different address.
200
 The con-
tractor received this letter; however, a copy of it was never intro-
 
 188. Id. at 306, 777 S.E.2d at 566–67. 
 189. Id. at 306, 777 S.E.2d at 567. 
 190. See id. at 307–08, 777 S.E.2d at 567. 
 191. Id. at 308, 777 S.E.2d at 567. 
 192. Id.  
 193. Id. at 310, 777 S.E.2d at 568–69. 
 194. Id. at 310, 777 S.E.2d at 568. 
 195. 290 Va. 492, 494, 777 S.E.2d 851, 853 (2015).  
 196. Id. at 495, 777 S.E.2d at 853.  
 197. Id.  
 198. Id. at 495, 777 S.E.2d at 854.  
 199. Id.  
 200. Id.  
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duced into evidence.
201
 No evidence at trial disclosed the contents 
of that letter.
202
 
In reversing the contractor‘s construction fraud conviction, the 
supreme court observed that Virginia Code section 18.2-2000.1 
has ―highly specific language to protect against the risk of being 
interpreted as a means of criminalizing mere contractual de-
faults.‖
203
 The statute‘s notice requirement requires the certified 
letter to contain an ―unqualified demand‖ for the return of the 
advance.
204
 The notice cannot give the contractor other options—
―such as continued contractual performance at a reduced price, 
the return of something other than the advance, or the delivery of 
materials in lieu of a return of the advance.‖
205
 In this case, the 
supreme court was unable to discern the contents of the demand 
letters based on the evidence presented and the testimony giv-
en.
206
 Thus, the evidence failed to prove that the homeowner made 
an unqualified demand for the return of the advance.
207
 
3. Firearms 
In Jones v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia de-
fined the term ―firearm‖  in the reckless handling of a firearm 
statute.
208
 After a manager of a grocery store followed a suspected 
shoplifter to the parking lot, he saw the defendant had a handgun 
and ―heard two or three loud gunshots.‖
209
 The defendant was 
charged with reckless handling of a firearm under Virginia Code 
section 18.2-56.1(A) and with possession of a firearm as a convict-
ed felon under section 18.2-308.2.
210
 At trial, ―he moved to strike 
the evidence.‖
211
 The court granted the motion regarding the pos-
session charge, but denied it for the reckless handling charge.
212
 
 
 201. Id.  
 202. Id.  
 203. Id. at 497, 777 S.E.2d at 855. 
 204. Id. at 498, 777 S.E.2d at 856. 
 205. Id. at 498–99, 777 S.E.2d at 856. 
 206. Id. at 500, 777 S.E.2d at 857.  
 207. Id. at 501, 777 S.E.2d at 857. 
 208. 65 Va. App. 274, 276–77, 777 S.E.2d 229, 230–31 (2015).  
 209. Id. at 276, 777 S.E.2d at 230. 
 210. Id. at 277, 777 S.E.2d at 230.  
 211. Id.  
 212. Id.  
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The court of appeals recognized that caselaw has defined the 
term ―firearm‖ differently depending on whether or not a statute‘s 
purpose is to prevent even the appearance of an actual firearm.
213
 
For example, the Supreme Court of Virginia has defined the use 
of a firearm during the commission of a felony under Virginia 
Code section 18.2-53.1 more broadly than possessing a firearm as 
a convicted felon under Code section 18.2-308.2.
214
 Under Code 
section 18.2-308.2, a victim cannot merely perceive an object as a 
firearm, the object must be ―an instrument which was designed, 
made, and intended to expel a projectile by means of an explo-
sion.‖
215
 The court of appeals explained that the ―manifest pur-
pose‖ of reckless handling of a firearm under Code section 18.2-
56.1(A) ―is to prevent actual endangerment, not the mere appear-
ance of endangerment.‖
216
 Thus, the court of appeals employed the 
definition of ―firearm‖ that applies to Code section 18.2-308.2, ra-
ther than the broader standard that applies for prosecutions un-
der Code section 18.2-53.1.
217
 Because the circuit court acquitted 
the defendant of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon and 
that definition of a ―firearm‖ is the same reckless handling of a 
firearm, the trial court rendered inconsistent verdicts.
218
 And be-
cause a trial court may not render an inconsistent verdict in a 
bench trial, the court of appeals reversed the defendant‘s convic-
tion for reckless handling of a firearm.
219
 
In Prekker v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia 
decided whether a portion of Virginia Code section 18.2-308.2‘s 
firearm ban violated the defendant‘s Second Amendment rights.
220
 
The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge that 
he illegally possessed a firearm in violation of Virginia Code sec-
tion 18.2-308.2 after having been previously adjudicated a delin-
quent for an offense that would have been a felony had he been 
 
 213. Id.  
 214. Id. at 277–78, 777 S.E.2d at 230 (citing Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 
573, 582, 562 S.E.2d 139, 144 (2002)).  
 215. Id. at 278, 777 S.E.2d at 230 (quoting Armstrong, 263 Va. at 584, 562 S.E.2d at 
145). 
 216. Id. at 278, 777 S.E.2d at 231. 
 217. Id.  
 218. Id. at 279, 777 S.E.2d at 231. 
 219. Id. at 279–80, 777 S.E.2d at 231. 
 220. 66 Va. App. 103, 104–05, 782 S.E.2d 604, 604 (2016).  
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an adult.
221
 In doing so, the defendant preserved his argument for 
appeal that, as applied to him, Code section 18.2-308.2‘s tempo-
rary ban on him possessing a firearm until the age of twenty-nine 
violates his Second Amendment right ―to keep and bear arms.‖
222
 
In rejecting this argument, the court of appeals noted that the 
Supreme Court of the United States decision in District of Co-
lumbia v. Heller
223
 identified ―presumptively valid regulations‖ on 
firearms such as bans on firearms for convicted felons.
224
 The 
court of appeals held ―a ban on possession by a juvenile who was 
adjudicated delinquent for a felonious act rests on the same foot-
ing as the presumptively constitutional ban on a felon possessing 
firearms.‖
225
 
4.  Obtaining Money by False Pretenses 
In Reid v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia 
took up the question of when title or ownership passes to the per-
petrator to support a conviction of obtaining money by false pre-
tenses.
226
 Reid scammed two different victims out of hundreds of 
dollars by telling them his car had been illegally towed and, that 
if they loaned him money to retrieve the car, he would repay 
them extra for their assistance.
227
 
Reid was convicted of obtaining money by false pretenses, 
which ―unlike larceny by trick, requires that title or ownership 
pass to the perpetrator.‖
228
 Reid argued that ―because the victims 
loaned money expecting to receive repayment and additional prof-
it,‖ he only gained ―temporary possession of their funds.‖
229
 The 
court of appeals acknowledged that determining when title or 
ownership passes with currency is less straightforward than with 
tangible property.
230
 The question turns on whether ―the transfer 
 
 221. Id. at 105–06, 782 S.E.2d at 605.  
 222. Id. at 110, 782 S.E.2d at 607. 
 223. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).  
 224. Prekker, 66 Va. App. at 118, 782 S.E.2d at 611 (citing District of Columbia v. Hel-
ler, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008)).  
 225. Id. at 121, 782 S.E.2d at 613. 
 226. 65 Va. App. 745, 747, 781 S.E.2d 373, 374–75 (2016).  
 227. Id. at 747–48, 781 S.E.2d at 375. 
 228. Id. at 749, 781 S.E.2d at 375. 
 229. Id. at 752, 781 S.E.2d at 377. 
 230. Id. at 751, 781 S.E.2d at 376. 
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of currency was so that the defendant would use it on behalf of 
the victim (larceny by trick) or for his or her own benefit (false 
pretenses).‖
231
 Because the victims relinquished their funds for 
Reid to recover his vehicle, Reid committed larceny by false pre-
tenses.
232
 
5. Obstruction of Justice 
The Court of Appeals of Virginia addressed the crime of ob-
struction of justice in two published cases. In Molinet v. Com-
monwealth, one officer was investigating a reported fight while a 
second officer was tasked at maintaining a safe perimeter at the 
scene.
233
 The defendant attempted repeatedly to breach the pe-
rimeter and ignored the second officer‘s orders to move to the 
curb.
234
 The defendant shouted multiple expletives at the officer 
and stepped toward the officer in an aggressive manner.
235
 The 
court of appeals held that the defendant obstructed justice be-
cause the second officer was ―required to focus on [the defendant] 
and the threat posed by his actions‖ and was unable to perform 
his assigned duty of maintaining a safe perimeter.
236
 
In Thorne v. Commonwealth, a police officer stopped Thorne‘s 
car for suspected illegal window tint.
237
 The officer explained to 
Thorne why he stopped her car and that he needed her to roll 
down the window at least four to six inches so that he could test 
the legality of the window tint.
238
 At least five times during the 
course of the stop, the officer made that request, but Thorne re-
fused to roll down her window.
239
 Instead, she ―kept yelling that 
the window tint was legal and [the officer] had no reason to stop 
her.‖
240
 After the officer told Thorne that he would charge her 
with obstruction of justice if she did not comply, she responded by 
 
 231. Id. at 751, 781 S.E.2d at 377. 
 232. Id. at 752–53, 781 S.E.2d at 377. 
 233. 65 Va. App. 572, 574–75, 779 S.E.2d 231, 232 (2015). 
 234. Id. at 575, 779 S.E.2d at 232. 
 235. Id. at 575, 779 S.E.2d at 232–33. 
 236. Id. at 580–81, 779 S.E.2d at 235. 
 237. 66 Va. App. 248, 250–51, 784 S.E.2d 304, 305 (2016). 
 238. Id. at 250–51, 784 S.E.2d at 305. 
 239. Id. at 257, 784 S.E.2d at 309. 
 240. Id.  
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saying, ―I know my rights! Do what you gotta do!‖
241
 About nine 
minutes after the initial request, Thorne finally complied.
242
 In 
upholding Thorne‘s obstruction of justice conviction, the court of 
appeals concluded that she did more than merely make the of-
ficer‘s tasks more difficult; Thorne prevented his efforts to inves-
tigate the suspected window tint violation.
243
 
6. Strangulation 
In the combined opinion of Ricks v. Commonwealth and Com-
monwealth v. Chilton, the Supreme Court of Virginia resolved 
what constitutes ―bodily injury‖ under the strangulation statute, 
Virginia Code section 18.2-51.6.
244
 Drawing from how Virginia 
courts have interpreted ―bodily injury‖ under the malicious 
wounding statute, the supreme court elected a broad definition: 
[T]oday we hold that ―bodily injury‖ within the scope of Code § 18.2-
51.6 is any bodily injury whatsoever and includes an act of damage 
or harm or hurt that relates to the body; is an impairment of a func-
tion of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or is an act of im-
pairment of a physical condition.
245
 
In applying this definition, the supreme court affirmed Ricks‘s 
conviction where the victim was choked to the point that she 
could not speak for a couple of days leaving a red mark on her 
neck.
246
 As for Chilton, the supreme court affirmed the Court of 
Appeals of Virginia‘s reversal of his conviction, albeit on different 
grounds.
247
 The court of appeals had decided that loss of con-
sciousness alone was not enough to constitute bodily injury under 
the statute.
248
 The supreme court disagreed and held that uncon-
sciousness—no matter how brief—caused by pressure to the neck 
is sufficient to constitute a bodily injury under the statute.
249
 The 
victim, however, never clearly testified that Chilton actually ap-
 
 241. Id.  
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 256–57, 784 S.E.2d at 308–09. 
 244. 290 Va. 470, 473, 778 S.E.2d 332, 333 (2015).  
 245. Id. at 478, 778 S.E.2d at 336.   
 246. Id. at 478–79, 778 S.E.2d at 336. 
 247. Id. at 480, 778 S.E.2d at 336–37. 
 248. Id. at 480, 778 S.E.2d at 336.  
 249. Id. at 479–80, 778 S.E.2d at 336.  
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plied pressure to her neck or that she lost consciousness.
250
 The 
Commonwealth‘s evidence therefore was ―so minimal‖ that it 
failed to establish that the victim suffered a bodily injury in the 
form of a loss of consciousness.
251
 
III.  LEGISLATION 
A. Child Victim Hearsay Exception 
The 2016 Virginia General Assembly created a hearsay excep-
tion for out-of-court statements made by a child under the age of 
thirteen who is the alleged victim of an ―offense against chil-
dren.‖
252
 The statute lists a number of felonies that fall within the 
definition of an ―offense against children.‖
253
 In a proceeding in 
which the statement will be offered into evidence, notice of intent 
to offer the statement and the statement itself must be given to 
the adverse party at least fourteen days in advance.
254
 In addition, 
the court must hold a pre-trial hearing and find: (1) the state-
ment is trustworthy and (2) the child either (a) testifies or (b) is 
declared unavailable and there is corroborative evidence of the 
act.
255
 The statute provides a non-exhaustive list of factors for the 
court to consider when making the trustworthiness determina-
tion.
256
 
B. Protective Orders and Stalking 
A number of legislative enactments took aim at combatting 
domestic violence.
257
 The 2016 Virginia General Assembly elevat-
ed possession of a firearm while under a permanent protective 
 
 250. Id. at 480, 778 S.E.2d at 337. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Act of Mar. 29, 2016, ch. 553, 2016 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. 
CODE ANN. § 19.2-268.3 (Repl. Vol. 2015 & Cum. Supp. 2016)). 
 253. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-268.3 (Repl. Vol. 2015 & Cum. Supp. 2016).  
 254. Id.  
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. See Jennifer L. McClellan, Opinion, Virginia Takes Steps to Ease Domestic Vio-
lence Epidemic, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, (Mar. 5, 2016, 10:30 PM), http://www.richmond. 
com/opinion/their-opinion/guest-columnists/article_3114f60e-5b7e-512f-8ca8-06460cac478 
1.html?mode=story.  
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order for domestic abuse to a Class 6 Felony.
258
 Under this legisla-
tion, any person subject to such a permanent protective order 
must relinquish his or her firearms within twenty-four hours of 
being served the order.
259
 
The 2016 Virginia General Assembly also created a Class 6 fel-
ony for persons who violate a protective order while armed with a 
firearm or other deadly weapon.
260
 Additionally, it is now a Class 
6 felony to stalk a party with a protective order.
261
 And, a second 
stalking offense committed within five years of any prior stalking 
conviction is now a Class 6 felony.
262
 
Finally, the 2016 Virginia General Assembly amended the 
proof required to prove stalking.
263
 Now under the statute, follow-
ing, contacting, or attempting to do so, after being given actual 
notice that the person does not want to be contacted or followed, 
is prima facie evidence that the suspect intended to place the vic-
tim in fear of death, criminal sexual assault, or bodily injury to 
the victim or a family or household member.
264
 
C.  Sexual Assault Recovery Kits 
The 2016 Virginia General Assembly established a comprehen-
sive procedure for the collection and analysis of physical evidence 
recovery kits for victims of sexual assault.
265
 Kits from victims 
who elect not to report a sexual assault to law enforcement will be 
stored at the Division of Consolidated Laboratory Services for a 
 
 258. Act of Feb. 26, 2016, ch. 48, 2016 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 18.2-308.09, -308.1:4, -308.2:3 (Repl. Vol. 2014 & Cum. Supp. 2016)). 
 259. Id.  
 260. Act of Mar. 29, 2016, ch. 585, 2016 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. 
CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.2 (Repl. Vol. 2015 & Cum. Supp. 2016); id. § 18.2-60.4 (Repl. Vol. 
2014 & Cum. Supp. 2016)). 
 261. Act of Mar. 29, 2016, ch. 583, 2016 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. 
CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.2 (Repl. Vol. 2015 & Cum. Supp. 2016); id. § 18.2-60.4 (Repl. Vol. 
2014 & Cum. Supp. 2016)). 
 262. Act of Apr. 4, 2016, ch. 696, 2016 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 16.1-253.2 (Repl. Vol. 2014 & Cum. Supp. 2016); id. § 18.2-60.4 (Repl. Vol. 2014 & 
Cum. Supp. 2016)). 
 263. Act of Apr. 20, 2016, ch. 745, 2016 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. 
CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3 (Repl. Vol. 2014 & Cum. Supp. 2016)). 
 264. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3 (Repl. Vol. 2014 & Cum. Supp. 2016). 
 265. Act of Mar. 11, 2016, ch. 332, 2016 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-11.5 to -11.11 (Repl. Vol. 2015 & Cum. Supp. 2016)). 
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minimum of two years.
266
 When the victim elects to report the of-
fense to law enforcement at the time of the exam, law enforce-
ment is required to take possession of the victim‘s kit and submit 
the kit to the Department of Forensic Science for analysis within 
sixty days.
267
 The legislation also outlines the exceptions to man-
datory submissions for analysis; storage requirements for reten-
tion of analyzed samples; expungement of DNA samples obtained 
but not connected to a crime; and victims‘ notification rights.
268
 
Notably, a person accused or convicted of committing a crime 
against a sexual assault victim has no standing to object to any 
failure to comply with the requirements.
269
 And, the failure to 
comply with the requirements shall not be grounds for challeng-
ing the admissibility of the evidence or setting aside the convic-
tion or sentence.
270
 
D.  Stolen Valor 
In 2012, a plurality of the Supreme Court of the United States 
struck down the federal government‘s ―Stolen Valor Act,‖ holding 
that lying about military heroics was constitutionally protected 
speech.
271
 A year later, the federal government passed a new Sto-
len Valor Act, which prohibited fraudulently holding oneself out 
to be a recipient of several military decorations or medals with 
the intent to obtain money, property, or other tangible benefit.
272
 
The 2016 Virginia General Assembly passed similar legislation.
273
 
Under the new law, it is a Class 1 misdemeanor for any person to 
intentionally obtain any services through false representations of 
military service.
274
 
 
 
 266. Id.  
 267. Id.  
 268. Id. 
 269. Id.  
 270. Id. 
 271. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012). 
 272. 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2012 & Supp. I 2013). 
 273. See Act of Mar. 4, 2016, ch. 236, 2016 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. 
CODE ANN. § 18.2-177.1 (Repl. Vol. 2014 & Cum. Supp. 2016)). 
 274. Id.  
